T1078.001: Default Accounts
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS and the default service account in Kubernetes.
Default accounts are not limited to client machines, rather also include accounts that are preset for equipment such as network devices and computer applications whether they are internal, open source, or commercial. Appliances that come preset with a username and password combination pose a serious threat to organizations that do not change it post installation, as they are easy targets for an adversary. Similarly, adversaries may also utilize publicly disclosed or stolen Private Keys or credential materials to legitimately connect to remote environments via Remote Services.
Positive Technologies products that cover the technique
MaxPatrol SIEM knowledge base
web_servers_abnormal_activity: PT-CR-1970: Web_Servers_Abnormal_Activity_Login_With_Default_Credentials: An attacker can use the default account to get access to a host
sap_suspicious_user_activity: PT-CR-231: SAPASABAP_Create_client_and_login: A user escalated himself privileges in the system
sap_suspicious_user_activity: PT-CR-238: SAPASABAP_EARLYWATCH_connect: Violation of the standard usage scenario for the EARLYWATCH user and client 066
supply_chain: PT-CR-1765: SupplyChain_Default_Account_Logon: A user logged in or attempted to log in to an application under a default account
sap_java_suspicious_user_activity: PT-CR-541: SAPASJAVA_Password_changed_for_SAP_standard_users_and_logon: The password of a default user was changed, then a user logged in under this account
uem_safemobile: PT-CR-2289: SafeMobile_Default_Account_Logon: Login to an application under a default account
active_directory_attacks: PT-CR-656: Failed_Network_Access_with_Unknown_User: A user failed to log in to a host running Windows on behalf of a disabled or non-existent account. This may indicate account bruteforcing or compromised credentials.
clickhouse: PT-CR-1567: ClickHouse_logon_same_user_from_different_hosts: Attempts to log in to a DBMS under the same account from different hosts are detected
clickhouse: PT-CR-1579: ClickHouse_logon_same_host_different_users: Attempts to log in to a DBMS under different user accounts from the same host are detected
clickhouse: PT-CR-1580: ClickHouse_logon_of_significant_user: DBMS login under an account from the ClickHouse_significant_users tabular list is detected
sap_attack_detection: PT-CR-150: SAPASABAP_Bultin_accounts_probing: Attempts to log in with built-in accounts
sap_attack_detection: PT-CR-152: SAPASABAP_Delete_sapstar_and_login: The SAP* account is deleted and the system is accessed with the default password
sap_attack_detection: PT-CR-160: SAPASABAP_Using_bultin_accounts: Usage of a built-in account
Detection
ID | DS0002 | Data source and component | User Account: User Account Authentication | Description | Monitor for an attempt by a user to gain access to a network or computing resource, often by providing credentials |
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ID | DS0028 | Data source and component | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation | Description | Monitor for newly constructed logon behavior across default accounts that have been activated or logged into. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately. |
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Mitigation
ID | M1027 | Name | Password Policies | Description | Applications and appliances that utilize default username and password should be changed immediately after the installation, and before deployment to a production environment. |
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