T1098.001: Additional Cloud Credentials
Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment.
For example, adversaries may add credentials for Service Principals and Applications in addition to existing legitimate credentials in Azure AD. These credentials include both x509 keys and passwords. With sufficient permissions, there are a variety of ways to add credentials including the Azure Portal, Azure command line interface, and Azure or Az PowerShell modules.
In infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environments, after gaining access through Cloud Accounts, adversaries may generate or import their own SSH keys using either the CreateKeyPair
or ImportKeyPair
API in AWS or the gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add
command in GCP. This allows persistent access to instances within the cloud environment without further usage of the compromised cloud accounts.
Adversaries may also use the CreateAccessKey
API in AWS or the gcloud iam service-accounts keys create
command in GCP to add access keys to an account. If the target account has different permissions from the requesting account, the adversary may also be able to escalate their privileges in the environment (i.e. Cloud Accounts). For example, in Azure AD environments, an adversary with the Application Administrator role can add a new set of credentials to their application's service principal. In doing so the adversary would be able to access the service principal’s roles and permissions, which may be different from those of the Application Administrator.
In AWS environments, adversaries with the appropriate permissions may also use the sts:GetFederationToken
API call to create a temporary set of credentials to Forge Web Credentials tied to the permissions of the original user account. These temporary credentials may remain valid for the duration of their lifetime even if the original account’s API credentials are deactivated.
Detection
ID | DS0002 | Data source and component | User Account: User Account Modification | Description | Monitor for unexpected changes to cloud user accounts, such as Azure Activity Logs highlighting malicious Service Principal and Application modifications. Monitor for the use of API and CLI commands that add access keys or tokens to accounts, such as |
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Mitigation
ID | M1032 | Name | Multi-factor Authentication | Description | Use multi-factor authentication for user and privileged accounts. Consider enforcing multi-factor authentication for the |
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ID | M1018 | Name | User Account Management | Description | Ensure that low-privileged user accounts do not have permission to add access keys to accounts. In AWS environments, prohibit users from calling the |
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ID | M1030 | Name | Network Segmentation | Description | Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to critical systems and domain controllers. Most cloud environments support separate virtual private cloud (VPC) instances that enable further segmentation of cloud systems. |
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ID | M1026 | Name | Privileged Account Management | Description | Do not allow domain administrator or root accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems. |
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