Technique on mitre.org

T1112: Modify Registry

Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to hide configuration information within Registry keys, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in persistence and execution.

Access to specific areas of the Registry depends on account permissions, some requiring administrator-level access. The built-in Windows command-line utility Reg may be used for local or remote Registry modification. Other tools may also be used, such as a remote access tool, which may contain functionality to interact with the Registry through the Windows API.

Registry modifications may also include actions to hide keys, such as prepending key names with a null character, which will cause an error and/or be ignored when read via Reg or other utilities using the Win32 API. Adversaries may abuse these pseudo-hidden keys to conceal payloads/commands used to maintain persistence.

The Registry of a remote system may be modified to aid in execution of files as part of lateral movement. It requires the remote Registry service to be running on the target system. Often Valid Accounts are required, along with access to the remote system's SMB/Windows Admin Shares for RPC communication.

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MaxPatrol SIEM knowledge base

mitre_attck_defense_evasion: PT-CR-563: Changing_Restricted_Admin_Settings: Restricted Admin mode settings were modified using registry keys. This may be an attacker's attempt to weaken security in order to obtain credentials of users in the process of authentication or to connect to a host via RDP using a hash.

Detection

ID	DS0017	Data source and component	Command: Command Execution	Description	Monitor executed commands and arguments for actions that could be taken to change, conceal, and/or delete information in the Registry. The Registry may also be modified through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.

ID	DS0029	Data source and component	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow	Description	Remote access to the registry can be achieved via Windows API function RegConnectRegistry command line via reg.exe graphically via regedit.exe All of these behaviors call into the Windows API, which uses the NamedPipe WINREG over SMB to handle the protocol information. This network can be decoded with wireshark or a similar sensor, and can also be detected by hooking the API function. Analytic 1 - Remote Registry `source="Zeek:" (dest_port="445" AND proto_info.pipe="WINREG") OR (proto_info.function="Create" OR proto_info.function="SetValue")`

ID	DS0024	Data source and component	Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion	Description	Monitor for unexpected deletion of windows registry keys to hide configuration information, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in persistence and execution.

ID	DS0024	Data source and component	Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation	Description	Monitor for newly constructed registry keys or values to aid in persistence and execution. Detection of creation of registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\SafeDllSearchMode. The key SafeDllSearchMode, if set to 0, will block the Windows mechanism for the search DLL order and adversaries may execute their own malicious dll. Analytic 1 - Registry Edit with Creation of SafeDllSearchMode Key Set to 0 `((source="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode="4657")(ObjectValueName="SafeDllSearchMode" value="0")) OR ((source="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode="13") EventType="SetValue" TargetObject="*SafeDllSearchMode" Details="DWORD (0x00000000)")))`

ID	DS0024	Data source and component	Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification	Description	Monitor for changes made to windows registry keys or values. Consider enabling Registry Auditing on specific keys to produce an alertable event (Event ID 4657) whenever a value is changed (though this may not trigger when values are created with Reghide or other evasive methods). Changes to Registry entries that load software on Windows startup that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious, as are additions or changes to files within the startup folder. Changes could also include new services and modification of existing binary paths to point to malicious files. If a change to a service-related entry occurs, then it will likely be followed by a local or remote service start or restart to execute the file. Detection of modification of the registry key values of Notify, Userinit, and Shell located in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\ and HKEY_LOCAL_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon. When a user logs on, the Registry key values of Notify, Userinit and Shell are used to load dedicated Windows component. Attackers may insert malicious payload following the legitimate value to launch a malicious payload. Detection of the modification of the registry key Common Startup located in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders\ and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders. When a user logs on, any files located in the Startup Folder are launched. Attackers may modify these folders with other files in order to evade detection set on these default folders. This detection focuses on EventIDs 4688 and 1 for process creation and EventID 4657 for the modification of the Registry Keys. Analytic 1 - Registry Edit with Modification of Userinit, Shell or Notify `source="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode="4657" (ObjectValueName="Userinit" OR ObjectValueName="Shell" OR ObjectValueName="Notify") OR source="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode="13" (TargetObject="Userinit" OR TargetObject="Shell" OR TargetObject="Notify")` Analytic 2 - Modification of Default Startup Folder in the Registry Key 'Common Startup' `(source="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode="4657" ObjectValueName="Common Startup") OR (source="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode="13" TargetObject="Common Startup")`

ID	DS0009	Data source and component	Process: OS API Execution	Description	Monitor for API calls associated with concealing Registry keys, such as Reghide. Inspect and cleanup malicious hidden Registry entries using Native Windows API calls and/or tools such as Autoruns and RegDelNull . Other API calls relevant to Registry Modification include `RegOpenKeyExA`, `RegCreateKeyExA`, `RegDeleteKeyExA`, `RegDeleteValueExA`, `RegEnumKeyExA`, `RegEnumValueExA`, among others. Note: Most EDR tools do not support direct monitoring of API calls due to the sheer volume of calls produced by an endpoint but may have alerts or events that are based on abstractions of OS API calls. Dynamic malware analysis tools (i.e., sandboxes) can be used to trace the execution, including OS API calls, for a single PE binary.

ID	DS0009	Data source and component	Process: Process Creation	Description	Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to change, conceal, and/or delete information in the Registry. (i.e. reg.exe, regedit.exe). The analytic is oriented around detecting invocations of Reg where the parent executable is an instance of cmd.exe that wasn’t spawned by explorer.exe. The built-in utility reg.exe provides a command-line interface to the registry, so that queries and modifications can be performed from a shell, such as cmd.exe. When a user is responsible for these actions, the parent of cmd.exewill typically be explorer.exe. Occasionally, power users and administrators write scripts that do this behavior as well, but likely from a different process tree. These background scripts must be baselined so they can be tuned out accordingly. Analytic Event IDs are for Sysmon (Event ID 1 - process create) and Windows Security Log (Event ID 4688 - a new process has been created). Analytic 1 - Registry Edit with Modification of Userinit, Shell or Notify `(source="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode="1") OR (source="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode="4688") ((CommandLine="reg" CommandLine="add" CommandLine="/d") OR ((CommandLine="Set-ItemProperty" OR CommandLine="New-ItemProperty") AND CommandLine="-value")) CommandLine="\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" (CommandLine="Userinit" OR CommandLine="Shell" OR CommandLine="Notify")` Analytic 2 - Modification of Default Startup Folder in the Registry Key 'Common Startup' `(source="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode="1") OR (source="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode="4688") (CommandLine="reg" AND CommandLine="add" AND CommandLine="/d") OR (CommandLine="Set-ItemProperty" AND CommandLine="-value") CommandLine="Common Startup"` Analytic 3 - Registry Edit with Creation of SafeDllSearchMode Key Set to 0 `(source="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode="1") OR (source="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode="4688")((CommandLine="reg" CommandLine="add" CommandLine="/d") OR (CommandLine="Set-ItemProperty" CommandLine="-value")) (CommandLine="00000000" OR CommandLine="0") CommandLine="SafeDllSearchMode")`

ID	Data source and component	Description
DS0017	Command: Command Execution	Monitor executed commands and arguments for actions that could be taken to change, conceal, and/or delete information in the Registry. The Registry may also be modified through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.
DS0029	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow	Remote access to the registry can be achieved via Windows API function RegConnectRegistry command line via reg.exe graphically via regedit.exe All of these behaviors call into the Windows API, which uses the NamedPipe WINREG over SMB to handle the protocol information. This network can be decoded with wireshark or a similar sensor, and can also be detected by hooking the API function. Analytic 1 - Remote Registry `source="Zeek:" (dest_port="445" AND proto_info.pipe="WINREG") OR (proto_info.function="Create" OR proto_info.function="SetValue")`
DS0024	Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion	Monitor for unexpected deletion of windows registry keys to hide configuration information, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in persistence and execution.
DS0024	Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation	Monitor for newly constructed registry keys or values to aid in persistence and execution. Detection of creation of registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\SafeDllSearchMode. The key SafeDllSearchMode, if set to 0, will block the Windows mechanism for the search DLL order and adversaries may execute their own malicious dll. Analytic 1 - Registry Edit with Creation of SafeDllSearchMode Key Set to 0 `((source="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode="4657")(ObjectValueName="SafeDllSearchMode" value="0")) OR ((source="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode="13") EventType="SetValue" TargetObject="*SafeDllSearchMode" Details="DWORD (0x00000000)")))`
DS0024	Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification	Monitor for changes made to windows registry keys or values. Consider enabling Registry Auditing on specific keys to produce an alertable event (Event ID 4657) whenever a value is changed (though this may not trigger when values are created with Reghide or other evasive methods). Changes to Registry entries that load software on Windows startup that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious, as are additions or changes to files within the startup folder. Changes could also include new services and modification of existing binary paths to point to malicious files. If a change to a service-related entry occurs, then it will likely be followed by a local or remote service start or restart to execute the file. Detection of modification of the registry key values of Notify, Userinit, and Shell located in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\ and HKEY_LOCAL_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon. When a user logs on, the Registry key values of Notify, Userinit and Shell are used to load dedicated Windows component. Attackers may insert malicious payload following the legitimate value to launch a malicious payload. Detection of the modification of the registry key Common Startup located in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders\ and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders. When a user logs on, any files located in the Startup Folder are launched. Attackers may modify these folders with other files in order to evade detection set on these default folders. This detection focuses on EventIDs 4688 and 1 for process creation and EventID 4657 for the modification of the Registry Keys. Analytic 1 - Registry Edit with Modification of Userinit, Shell or Notify `source="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode="4657" (ObjectValueName="Userinit" OR ObjectValueName="Shell" OR ObjectValueName="Notify") OR source="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode="13" (TargetObject="Userinit" OR TargetObject="Shell" OR TargetObject="Notify")` Analytic 2 - Modification of Default Startup Folder in the Registry Key 'Common Startup' `(source="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode="4657" ObjectValueName="Common Startup") OR (source="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode="13" TargetObject="Common Startup")`
DS0009	Process: OS API Execution	Monitor for API calls associated with concealing Registry keys, such as Reghide. Inspect and cleanup malicious hidden Registry entries using Native Windows API calls and/or tools such as Autoruns and RegDelNull . Other API calls relevant to Registry Modification include `RegOpenKeyExA`, `RegCreateKeyExA`, `RegDeleteKeyExA`, `RegDeleteValueExA`, `RegEnumKeyExA`, `RegEnumValueExA`, among others. Note: Most EDR tools do not support direct monitoring of API calls due to the sheer volume of calls produced by an endpoint but may have alerts or events that are based on abstractions of OS API calls. Dynamic malware analysis tools (i.e., sandboxes) can be used to trace the execution, including OS API calls, for a single PE binary.
DS0009	Process: Process Creation	Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to change, conceal, and/or delete information in the Registry. (i.e. reg.exe, regedit.exe). The analytic is oriented around detecting invocations of Reg where the parent executable is an instance of cmd.exe that wasn’t spawned by explorer.exe. The built-in utility reg.exe provides a command-line interface to the registry, so that queries and modifications can be performed from a shell, such as cmd.exe. When a user is responsible for these actions, the parent of cmd.exewill typically be explorer.exe. Occasionally, power users and administrators write scripts that do this behavior as well, but likely from a different process tree. These background scripts must be baselined so they can be tuned out accordingly. Analytic Event IDs are for Sysmon (Event ID 1 - process create) and Windows Security Log (Event ID 4688 - a new process has been created). Analytic 1 - Registry Edit with Modification of Userinit, Shell or Notify `(source="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode="1") OR (source="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode="4688") ((CommandLine="reg" CommandLine="add" CommandLine="/d") OR ((CommandLine="Set-ItemProperty" OR CommandLine="New-ItemProperty") AND CommandLine="-value")) CommandLine="\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" (CommandLine="Userinit" OR CommandLine="Shell" OR CommandLine="Notify")` Analytic 2 - Modification of Default Startup Folder in the Registry Key 'Common Startup' `(source="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode="1") OR (source="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode="4688") (CommandLine="reg" AND CommandLine="add" AND CommandLine="/d") OR (CommandLine="Set-ItemProperty" AND CommandLine="-value") CommandLine="Common Startup"` Analytic 3 - Registry Edit with Creation of SafeDllSearchMode Key Set to 0 `(source="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode="1") OR (source="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode="4688")((CommandLine="reg" CommandLine="add" CommandLine="/d") OR (CommandLine="Set-ItemProperty" CommandLine="-value")) (CommandLine="00000000" OR CommandLine="0") CommandLine="SafeDllSearchMode")`

Mitigation

ID	M1024	Name	Restrict Registry Permissions	Description	Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys for system components that may lead to privilege escalation.

ID	Name	Description
M1024	Restrict Registry Permissions	Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys for system components that may lead to privilege escalation.