Technique on mitre.org

T1546.015: Component Object Model Hijacking

Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects. COM is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system. References to various COM objects are stored in the Registry.

Adversaries can use the COM system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through normal system operation the adversary's code will be executed instead. An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability that could lead to detection.

Positive Technologies products that cover the technique

MaxPatrol SIEM knowledge base

vulnerabilities: PT-CR-2314: CVE_2024_21378_Outlook_RCE: Exploitation of vulnerability CVE-2024-21378 in Outlook. The vulnerability allows code execution using Outlook forms. mitre_attck_persistence: PT-CR-265: COM_Object_Persistence: An attempt to modify Component Object Model references and Interop in the Microsoft Windows registry is detected

Detection

ID	DS0009	Data source and component	Process: Process Creation	Description	Monitor newly executed processes that may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects.

ID	DS0011	Data source and component	Module: Module Load	Description	Likewise, if software DLL loads are collected and analyzed, any unusual DLL load that can be correlated with a COM object Registry modification may indicate COM hijacking has been performed.

ID	DS0024	Data source and component	Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification	Description	There are opportunities to detect COM hijacking by searching for Registry references that have been replaced and through Registry operations (ex: Reg) replacing known binary paths with unknown paths or otherwise malicious content. Even though some third-party applications define user COM objects, the presence of objects within HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\ may be anomalous and should be investigated since user objects will be loaded prior to machine objects in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID. Registry entries for existing COM objects may change infrequently. When an entry with a known good path and binary is replaced or changed to an unusual value to point to an unknown binary in a new location, then it may indicate suspicious behavior and should be investigated. Analytic 1 - Component Object Model Hijacking `source="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode IN (12, 13, 14) TargetObject= "\Software\Classes\CLSID*"`

ID	DS0017	Data source and component	Command: Command Execution	Description	Monitor executed commands and arguments that may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects. Note: Event ID 4104 (from the Microsoft-Windows-Powershell/Operational log) captures Powershell script blocks, which can be analyzed and used to detect on changes to COM registry keys, including HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID*.

ID	Data source and component	Description
DS0009	Process: Process Creation	Monitor newly executed processes that may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects.
DS0011	Module: Module Load	Likewise, if software DLL loads are collected and analyzed, any unusual DLL load that can be correlated with a COM object Registry modification may indicate COM hijacking has been performed.
DS0024	Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification	There are opportunities to detect COM hijacking by searching for Registry references that have been replaced and through Registry operations (ex: Reg) replacing known binary paths with unknown paths or otherwise malicious content. Even though some third-party applications define user COM objects, the presence of objects within HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\ may be anomalous and should be investigated since user objects will be loaded prior to machine objects in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID. Registry entries for existing COM objects may change infrequently. When an entry with a known good path and binary is replaced or changed to an unusual value to point to an unknown binary in a new location, then it may indicate suspicious behavior and should be investigated. Analytic 1 - Component Object Model Hijacking `source="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode IN (12, 13, 14) TargetObject= "\Software\Classes\CLSID*"`
DS0017	Command: Command Execution	Monitor executed commands and arguments that may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects. Note: Event ID 4104 (from the Microsoft-Windows-Powershell/Operational log) captures Powershell script blocks, which can be analyzed and used to detect on changes to COM registry keys, including HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID*.