T1090: Proxy
Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to further disguise the source of malicious traffic.
Adversaries can also take advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) to proxy command and control traffic.
Positive Technologies products that cover the technique
MaxPatrol SIEM knowledge base
mitre_attck_command_and_control: PT-CR-2598: Possible_Proxy_Usage: Network traffic proxying. Possible use of such utilities as Shadowsocks, NekoRay, RTUN, and Burp Suite. mitre_attck_command_and_control: PT-CR-428: Possible_Network_Local_Tunnel: Attempt to connect to a remote host using a tunnel. This may indicate that the tunnel is being used for network reconnaissance, accessing local resources, or lateral movement. mitre_attck_command_and_control: PT-CR-2564: Subrule_Possible_Network_Local_Tunnel: Multiple local network connections to a single port or multiple network connections to a single IP address. This may indicate network traffic proxying. mitre_attck_command_and_control: PT-CR-2599: Subrule_Possible_Proxy_Usage: Multiple network connections to or within a single host using a single process. This may indicate the use of a network traffic proxying utility.
Subtechniques
Detection
ID | DS0029 | Data source and component | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Description | Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
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ID | DS0029 | Data source and component | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | Description | Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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ID | DS0029 | Data source and component | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation | Description | Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. |
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Mitigation
ID | M1031 | Name | Network Intrusion Prevention | Description | Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific C2 protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. |
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ID | M1037 | Name | Filter Network Traffic | Description | Traffic to known anonymity networks and C2 infrastructure can be blocked through the use of network allow and block lists. It should be noted that this kind of blocking may be circumvented by other techniques like Domain Fronting. |
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ID | M1020 | Name | SSL/TLS Inspection | Description | If it is possible to inspect HTTPS traffic, the captures can be analyzed for connections that appear to be domain fronting. |
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